This paper examines the investments and performance of community development venture capital (CDVC). We fi nd substantial differences between CDVC and traditional venture capital (VC) investments: CDVC investments are far more likely to be in nonmetropolitan regions and in regions with little prior venture capital activity. Moreover, CDVC is likely to be in earlier-stage investments and in industries outside the venture capital mainstream that have lower probabilities of successful exit. Even after we control for this unattractive transaction mix, the probability of a CDVC investment being successfully exited is lower. One benefi t of CDVCs may be their effect in bringing traditional VC investment to underserved regions: When we control for the presence of traditional VC investments, each additional CDVC investment results in an additional 0.06 new traditional VC fi rm in a region.
1. Introduction
The past two decades have seen increasing interest in harnessing the venture capital model to achieve socially targeted ends. Features of the venture capital model such as extensive due diligence, the use of convertible preferred securities with many control rights, formal and informal involvement in the governance of the firm, and the use of equity to incent management are now widely understood to be effective in addressing agency problems and uncertainty (for evidence and a review of the literature, see Gompers and Lerner (2004) and Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) ). The desire of policymakers and foundations to harness these tools to address broader social needs is understandable.
Reflecting this desire, numerous policy efforts have sought to encourage what are termed "community development" venture capital funds. In recent years, the Obama administration has designated as much as $5 billion in tax credits annually (more than 25 percent of the entire amount of venture capital funds raised in the US in 2009) for its "New Markets" venture capital initiative.
1 Similar efforts have been undertaken by the European Community and a number of member states (most notably, Great Britain), by a number of major foundations, and by a diverse array of other nations. These funds are characterized by a self-described "double bottom line" orientation: i.e., an attention to both private and social investment returns.
1 According to the US Treasury, "the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) Program permits taxpayers to receive a credit against Federal income taxes for making qualified equity investments in designated Community Development Entities (CDEs) . Substantially all of the qualified equity investment must in turn be used by the CDE to provide investments in lowincome communities" (http://www.cdfifund.gov/what_we_do/programs_id.asp?programID=5, accessed May 6, 2010).
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As compelling as it seems to apply a proven business strategy to community development, the process of marrying the venture capital model with community development is not necessarily obvious. One of the critical aspects of the venture capital process is the alignment of incentives so that all parties benefit from the same outcomes at similar times-i.e., at the time the investment is liquidated. With the presence of multiple objectives, it can be hard to ensure an optimal alignment of interests. Second, the aspiration of aligning private and social returns may be a false hope. It is possible that transactions refused by traditional VCs offer neither as attractive financial returns nor as wide-ranging social benefits. Finally, even if the community development venture capital model could work, the rules and limitations-for instance, on investment decisions and compensation-placed on firm by the funding bodies, whether governments or foundations, may undermine its prospects (Lerner (2009) ).
Despite these challenging issues, community development venture capital funds (CDVCs) have received remarkably little attention in corporate finance. This paper seeks to take a systematic look at these funds and their impact. Using a sample of 65 thousand venture capital investments in the United States between 1996 and October 2009, we proceed in three parts.
First, we examine how the composition of investments by community development venture funds differs from those of traditional groups. We find substantial differences:
Community development fund investments are far more likely to be in non-metropolitan regions and in regions with little prior venture activity. CDVC investments are likely to be in earlierstage investments and in industries outside the venture capital mainstream. Deals in which 3 traditional VCs invest alongside CDVCs share many of these features, but are more likely to be in the traditional VC industries.
Second, when we turn to considering the success of CDVC investments-as measured by the probability of going public or being acquired-we find that the types of deals where CDVC investments are concentrated have a lower probability of success in general. Even after controlling for this unattractive transaction mixture, however, the probability of a CDVC investment being successfully exited is lower.
In the third section, we examine the broader impact of these investments. While the relationship between the number of VC firms and the number of VC investments in a region is inherently difficult to estimate, we look to see if the presence of CDVCs and CDVC investments is associated with an increased number of non-CDVC firms. Controlling for the presence of traditional VC investments, each additional CDVC investment results in an additional 0.06 new traditional VC firms in a region. Of course, this result must be interpreted cautiously because it is possibly that CDVCs are simply investing in areas where traditional VCs are planning to grow.
If CDVCs really do increase the likelihood that traditional firms locate or invest in underserved regions, they play an important role in facilitating economic growth, even if their actual investments are not profitable, as a number of papers document that traditional venture capitalists play an important role in facilitating growth (for example Kortum and Lerner (2000) and Mollica and Zingales (2007) found to have funded firms that grew faster than their peers only in zip codes with VC activity (Lerner (1999 ), Wallsten (1999 ). But these programs typically differ substantially from community development venture programs. In a contemporaneous paper, Brander, et al. (2010) examine government programs across 57 countries, combining traditional funds which received public funding with those that had an ancillary community development role. They find that companies financed by government-backed VCs outperform as long as the share of funding from non government-backed funds is large enough.
The paper is also related to the economics literature on industrial clustering. This literature, which documents the importance of agglomeration externalities, motivates our analysis of the impact of CDVCs beyond the companies in which they directly invest. Our finding that CDVCs investments encourage traditional VCs and their investments is consistent with our previous work on agglomeration externalities in venture capital (Gompers, Kovner, and Lerner (2010) ) as well as with the broader evidence for geographic knowledge spillovers (see for example Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1998) and Agrawal, Kapur, and McHale (2008) We next determine whether the VC firm is a community development venture capital organization. To do this, we employ two sources. First, the CDVCA has maintained a roster of members on its website. We use the current and archived versions of this list (obtained through web.archive.org). Second, the CDFI fund has undertaken periodic surveys of entities receiving CDFI funds. We identify from these surveys all CDFI funds that have made equity investments.
We then match these lists of firms against the firms identified in VentureXpert. Of 57 potential
CDVCs identified, we match 32 venture capital firms to VentureXpert. 28 of these firms have made US investments tracked by VentureXpert.
We use these data to create several measures of venture capital investment success: first, we observe whether each venture-backed company went public through an IPO or registered for an IPO. We also determine whether the firm encountered another outcome, such as a bankruptcy or an acquisition. Following earlier work by ourselves and others, we define a successful outcome as either an IPO or an acquisition by another company. Table 1 provides an overview of the sample. The relatively small size of the CDVC sector is apparent. In total, we have 305 investments by 28 CDVCs, as compared to more than 65,000 investments by over 5,500 non-CDVC funds. In the first two panels, several differences between the two types of funds and their investments are statistically significant:
 The CDVCs are more likely to invest in earlier financing rounds, reflecting an orientation towards seed and early-stage investing.
 The firms backed by CDVCs have fewer venture investors participating in the rounds, and have undertaken fewer financing rounds in total. In part, though, this may reflect these firms' relative youth (see below).
 The CDVC-backed firms are substantially less likely to have gone public (1% vs. 13%) or to be successful (18% vs. 33%). Again, the relative youth of these firms must lead us to be cautious in interpreting the results.
 The CDVC-backed investments were likely to occur later than non-CDVC investments even though we only begin the sample in 1996, reflecting the relative youth of the sector.
In the third panel, we turn to the geography of CDVCs and their investments. Looking at the venture firms themselves, we see that CDVC funds are far more likely to be located in a CSA 13 with a population greater than one million (Large Metro Area) 8 (94% vs. 60% for the nonCDVCs). Their investments are strikingly different. CDVCs seem to shun investing in the San
Francisco area (3% vs. 30% for non-CDVC funds) and are more likely to be headquartered outside the ten regions that have historically attracted the most venture capital financing (57% vs. 49% of non-CDVC funds). Non-metropolitan areas, which account for a tiny fraction of non-CDVC fund investments, represent 5% of CDVC funds' investments. CDVC groups are also substantially more likely to invest locally (52% vs. 32%).
Finally, the fourth panel looks at the industry distribution of investments. The three industries that represent the bulk of venture activity-Internet and Computers, Energy, and
Biotech and Healthcare-are substantially underrepresented among the CDVCs (together, these three sectors represent 60% of investments by CDVCs, as opposed to 83% by the others).
CDVCs are much more likely to invest in such categories as Consumer, Business and Industrial, and Other.
The analysis
In the analysis, we proceed in three parts. First, we compare CDVC and non-CDVC transactions. Next, we look in depth at what considerations drive some transactions to be more successful than others. Finally, we examine whether investments by and with CDVCs has an effect on the subsequent choices by non-CDVC funds.
A. The nature of CDVC investments
In Tables 2 and 3 , we examine the characteristics of the CDVC deals. In Table 2 , we use all venture capital firm-company pairs as observations and employ a probit analysis to examine which transactions are CDVC deals, where the outcome variable is binary and equal to one if the investment in a company is made by a CDVC. In Table 3 , we employ a multinomial logit approach, where we compare transactions in which only CDVCs invest, transactions in which only non-CDVCs invest, as well as those syndicated between both CDVCs and traditional VCs.
Each observation in Table 3 is a single company, rather than a VC-company pair. Standard errors are clustered at the VC firm level in all specifications. if a little less consistent (all comparisons are done relative to the "other" category). The community development fund deals are far more likely to be in a non-metropolitan region, as well as in regions with little prior venture activity. The latter measure is captured by summing the previous VC investments in the region at the time of investment and dividing by the total number of VC investments in any region at the time of investment. The CDVC investments are also far more likely to be at earlier stages (those in the seed or expansion phase, as opposed to those that are later stage, LBO, other or unknown). The CDVC deals, even after controlling for the round of the investments, are associated with smaller venture rounds as well (though are interpretation here must be cautious due to the fact that investment size is determined in parallel with the decision to finance the firm).
In Table 3 , we look at alternative investor mixtures. We employ the investments by non-CDVC firms as the baseline and present exponentiated coefficients that can be interpreted as odds ratios. Coefficients less than one mean that there is a lower chance of that type of investor investing in that category than a non-CDVC. Columns 1 through 3 show that CDVC funds investing alone are far less likely to back numerous categories that are mainstays of traditional venture capital funds, including Internet and Computer, Communications, Energy, and Biotech and Health (again, all comparisons are done relative to the "Other" industry category). Again, these investments are far more likely to be outside of large metropolitan regions and (more weakly) in those with little venture activity. These transactions are concentrated in less developed companies and earlier financing rounds.
Turning to the co-investments between CDVCs and traditional venture organizations, we see in columns 4 through 6 that these share many of the geographic characteristics of the sole CDVC investments. These joint deals tend to be concentrated outside of large metropolitan areas and in areas with less venture activity. They also tend to be disproportionately early-stage ones.
The industry mixture, however, resembles much more closely the traditional distribution, with the exception of an overrepresentation of energy transactions.
B. The success of CDVC investments
We next turn to the success of these investments. Tables 4 and 5 employ a probit specification, where the dependent variable "success" takes on the value one if the company ultimately went public or was acquired. Each venture capital firm-company pair is used as an observation, with standard errors clustered on the venture capital firm level. In addition to specifications which include all investments, we run a separate specification including only investments made prior to 2005, in order to ensure that the portfolio companies have had enough to achieve a liquidity event such as an initial public offering or merger. In each specification, we employ fixed effects for the year of the observation.
The regression coefficients highlight the challenges that CDVCs face. The industries which are associated with the highest success rates-Internet and Computers, Communications and Electronics, and Biotech and Health-tend to be ones that the community development funds shy away from. Early-stage and expansion transactions, companies where the first investment is in an earlier round and those in regions with less venture activity are less likely to be successful, all else equal. Once again, these are ones where CDVCs disproportionately invest.
Similarly, less experienced venture capital groups have less successful investments.
Even after controlling for this challenging investment mixture, however, investments by CDVCs seem to substantially underperform on a financial basis. These investments are less likely to have a successful exit across all the specifications. The results are even more dramatic if we consider only IPOs as a success metric. Of the 55 successful CDVC investments, only three of them went public. The magnitude of the coefficient implies that for a first-stage investment in an industrial firm made in 2001, a CDFI is 11.1 percentage points less likely to be successful than a non-CDFI (half as likely) (specification 3).
In Table 5 , we examine the impact of the presence of both CDVC and non-CDVC investors. While we have very limited statistical significance, the negative relationship between success and CDVCs is driven by investments in which CDVCs have no non-CDVC co-investor.
The coefficient on a dummy variable equal to one if any investor is a CDFI is negative, but the coefficient on the interaction of CDVC and a non-CDVC investor is positive. This is consistent with Brander, et al. (2010) , who find negative results when government sponsored VCs do not invest with a sufficiently large number of non-government sponsored VCs.
C. The influence of CDVC co-investments So far, we have just examined the nature of private returns from CDVC funds. Brander, et al. (2010) employ a similar measure to assess the success of government-sponsored venture funds. They also employ a second performance measure, patent production, which they use to measure innovation. While patents are clearly also correlated with private returns, these performance measures may also reflect benefits to other parties through knowledge spillovers and the well-documented relationship between innovation and economic growth.
Unfortunately, it is much less reasonable here to examine patents as a measure of industry performance, given the underrepresentation of knowledge-intensive sectors in this sample relative to venture capital as a whole. It is not clear that patents will be as meaningful a measure of innovation in this setting.
We instead look at another measure of the broader impact of these funds: whether investments with and by a CDVC is associated with subsequent shift in behavior by traditional funds. While causation might be difficult to infer here-it may be that the reason traditional VC funds co-invest with CDVCs is because they are in the process of changing their investment 18 strategy in any case-the experience of working with a specialist in less popular categories or geographic regions of venture investing might introduce them to investment opportunities there. Chen et al. (2010) document the concentration of VC in New York, San Francisco and Boston but find that VC's may have a lower hurdle rate after they have already invested in a region.
CDVCs may thus help to bring VCs to new regions. Table 6 looks at this issue by comparing the investments made by traditional venture groups in the five years before and after co-investing with a community development fund. We employ fixed effects for each venture group (as well as for the year of the investment) to control for differences in groups' overall pattern of investments. The analysis provides some evidence of a shift in behavior after co-investment: the traditional groups are more likely to invest in regions with less venture activity. Once we look at reasonably seasoned deals, the success rates of the transaction before and after the co-investments do not significantly differ. Results are similar when the sample is limited to the 2.5 years before and after the first CDVC co-investment. Once again, our interpretation of these patterns must be cautious due to causality concerns.
D. The influence of CDVC investments on traditional VCs
While we do not see a direct impact of co-investing with VCs, it is possible that the presence of CDVCs in regions typically underserved by traditional VCs may influence other VCs to open offices or consider investments in those areas, even if they did not invest directly with the CDVC. In our previous work on the geographic clustering of VCs (Chen, et al. (2010) ), we find that VC firms locate in regions with high success rates of VC-backed investments. This suggests that VC firms are drawn to regions with an existing VC presence, perhaps because there are knowledge spillovers from other VC-backed companies or because their travel costs may be reduced when making multiple investments in a region.
In Tables 7 and 8 , we use as the dependent variable the number of non-CDVC firms and investments in a CSA, estimating all models at the CSA-Year level. We restrict the analysis to CSAs where at least one venture backed company existed between 1996 and 2006. This is broader than the analysis in Chen, et al. (2010) , to allow for the broadest sample set of possible VC locations. Thus in some CSA-Years, the number of offices can equal zero.
The dependent variable in Table 7 is the log of one plus either the total number of non-
CDVC firms in a CSA-Year (first five columns), or the number of new non-CDVC VC firms (next five columns). Firms are identified as new firms based on the year of their first investment
in the VentureXpert database. The dependent variable in Table 8 is the log of one plus the number of non-CDVC investments. We estimate the dependent variable as the log of one plus the variable of interest to allow the measure to be defined in cases where the variable is zero. All standard errors are clustered at the CSA level.
The key explanatory variable is the number of CDVC investments in the past 5 years in the CSA or the success rate of CDVC investments in the past 5 years in the CSA. Since both of these may be driven by the unobserved quality of the opportunities in a CSA, we control for this with the number of traditional VC investments in the CSA or with a dummy variable equal to one for the top three VC CSAs (New York, Boston and San Francisco).
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We also include controls for local characteristics which may be associated with venture capital investments. Again following Chen, et al. (2010) , these controls include the log of gross product per capita, the marginal income tax rate, and the long-term capital gains tax rate in the year prior to the investment. In order to capture an area's potential for innovation, we control for the percentage of population with a college degree in that CSA, as well as the number of patents per capita issued in the state in the previous year. When CSAs include multiple states we calculate an equally weighted average of the rates in each state. We include year fixed effects to control for changes in the supply of venture capital and investment opportunities. Tables 7 and 8 suggest that there may be a positive impact of CDVCs in attracting traditional VCs and their investments to the CSA. Even after controlling for investment opportunities in a region, the number of non-CDVC VC firms and the incremental change in VC firms is significantly positively related to the number of CDVC investments. An additional CDVC investment leads to an incremental 0.06 VC firms in a CSA (Table 7 , column (7)). While the level of statistical significance is lower, the magnitude of the coefficient on a CDVC is not significantly smaller than the coefficient on a VC investment, suggesting that CDVC investments have an equal likelihood of attracting VC firms to a region. The coefficient on the success rate of CDVCs in a region is also positive, although not statistically significant. Similarly, as shown in Table 8 , the number of CDVC investments is positively related to the number of non-CDVC investments in a region, although the coefficient is not statistically significant after controlling for the number of non-CDVC investments.
Conclusions
In conclusion, it does not seem that an investor in a CDVC can expect to do well by doing good. CDVC investments are less likely to go public or be acquired than are comparable investments by traditional VCs, even after controlling for lower average success rates in the types of industries and locations in which CDVCs invest.
When viewed through a broader lens of all stakeholders, however, CDVCs may have a positive return to their community. They invest in industries that are less likely to receive traditional VC capital and in regions without many traditional VCs. CDVC investments appear to attract VC firms and VC investments to regions in which they invest, even though they do not change the behavior of their direct co-investors.
There are many unanswered questions about CDVCs. We will mention three. Round number is the number round in which the VC firm's first investment was made. Number of VC firms is the log of the number of VC firms investing in that company. Log total raised in round is the log of the total amount raised in the VC firm's initial participation round. All specifications include year fixed effects. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the VC firm level. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Sample consists of all investments of 5,570 traditional VCs and 28 CDVCs in existence between 1996 and 2009. Specifications are at the VC/investment level and are probit specifications in which the dependent variable is equal to one in specifications (1) through (3) if all VC investors are CDVCs and in specifications (4) through (6) if any investor is a CDVC. Early stage investments are investments in portfolio companies that are developing their product or have begun initial marketing, manufacturing, and sales activities for their product. Expansion stage investments are companies that have product shipping and have begun expanding their business. Round number is the number round in which the VC firm's first investment was made. Number of VC firms is the log of the number of VC firms investing in that company. Log total raised in round is the log of the total amount raised in the VC firm's initial participation round. All specifications include year fixed effects. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the VC firm level. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. -11,543 -11,494 -11,352 -11,347 -11,339 -9,009 Chi The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of non CDVC venture capital firms in the CSA plus one receiving an initial investment in the current year. Geographic locations are assigned at the Combined Statistical Area (CSA) level. In cases where a city is not located in a CSA, we assign venture capital offices in the city to the appropriate Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). Log Number of CDVC investments is the logarithm of the number of CDVC-backed portfolio companies in the CSA plus one receiving an initial investment in past five years. Log Number of VC investments is the logarithm of the number of non-CDVC VC-backed portfolio companies in the CSA plus one receiving an initial investment in past five years. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of non CDVC venture capital firms' investments in the CSA plus one receiving an initial investment in the current year. Geographic locations are assigned at the Combined Statistical Area (CSA) level. In cases where a city is not located in a CSA, we assign venture capital offices in the city to the appropriate Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). Log Number of CDVC investments is the logarithm of the number of CDVC-backed portfolio companies in the CSA plus one receiving an initial investment in past five years. Log Number of VC investments is the logarithm of the number of non-CDVC VC-backed portfolio companies in the CSA plus one receiving an initial investment in past five years. 
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